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ABSTRACT: That there exists a history of thoughts represents less a question to be decided by 
research than an operative hypothesis or condition to undertake the majority of philosophical, 
theological, and scientific research in the first place. Put another way, the history of thoughts is a 
theory by which facts and findings of research in various disciplines may be coherently and 
meaningfully interpreted. Beyond the postulate that it is possible to cogently articulate a history 
of thoughts, however, this article intends to set forth the theory that there exists a history of thought 
itself, and to show that this theory can shed new light on our experience and conception of the 
world today. The topic of the present article, therefore, will be the evolution of consciousness, 
especially as articulated by Owen Barfield.  
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Robin G. Collingwood is well-remembered among scholarly readers for his bold 
assertion that “All history is the history of thought.”1 Rather than enter the fray 
of exegesis and dispute Collingwood’s provocative claim at the outset of the 
present article, suffice it merely propose the converse of his claim as a working 
hypothesis: what if thought itself has a history? That the latter may be born out 
by evidence, I hope to show in the study to follow by drawing on the insights and 
researches of Owen Barfield. Few thinkers have contemplated this question with 
greater perspicacity than Barfield, “the first and last Inkling.” Whether the fact 
 
1 Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1946), 315. 
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that Barfield has received less recognition than his peers J. R. R. Tolkien and C. 
S. Lewis is because he deserves less is a question that the reader may begin to 
answer for herself over the course of this brief study. I hope to show that neither 
lack of ingenuity nor insight can account for Barfield’s relative anonymity, but 
rather that his time has not yet come. Indeed, it is the present writer’s belief that 
on the day that Barfield’s work is understood, a claim like Collingwood’s will 
appear comparatively trivial. 
That there exists a history of thoughts represents less a question to be decided 
by research than an operative hypothesis or condition to undertake the majority 
of philosophical, theological, and scientific research in the first place. Put another 
way, the history of thoughts is a theory by which facts and findings of research in 
various disciplines may be coherently and meaningfully interpreted. Theory is a 
reading of what facts mean. Without such a theory, it is unlikely that any meaning 
will be found because one will not have been looking for it. Beyond the postulate 
that it is possible to cogently articulate a history of thoughts, however, I hope to set 
forth in this article the theory that there exists a history of thought itself, and to 
show that this theory can shed new light on our experience and conception of the 
world today. The topic of the present article, therefore, will be the evolution of 
consciousness.  
1.  INTRODUCTION AND PARTICIPATION  
To begin with, it will be crucial to apply certain strict distinctions in order to 
obviate the possibility of setting off to pursue a red-herring of a query and end up 
having chased one idea or another and not having inquired after the evolution of 
ideation at all. One such necessary preliminary is a careful delineation of the 
difference between thoughts and thought itself. To distinguish between an evolution 
of  ideas and an evolution of  consciousness reiterates the same distinction. Very pithily 
stated, the division above means to highlight the distinction between (a) what is 
perceived, experienced, and thought, and (b) how, or the manner in which, it is 
perceived and thought. Put another way, one concerns the objects of  the ideas and 
the other, the ideas as object. A statement by Plotinus may become something of a 
keynote for the present investigation: “Our general instinct to seek and learn will, 
in all reason set us inquiring into the nature of the instrument with which we 
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search.”2 In the present study, I intend to approach the history of ideas as facts and 
set forth a history of consciousness as a theory by which to understand the meaning 
of the former. If one should take, as an example of a historical datum, the 
constellation of ideas that makes up the Copernican picture of the solar system, 
then one may attempt to discern the backdrop against which this constellation of 
ideas is set. This may also be called the “world-conception” or “paradigm.” 
I will continue to trace the lineaments of the thesis above, but first a brief 
explication of the term “paradigm” is in order. By this term is meant something 
like “the basic and underlying conceptualization that grounds the relevant 
concepts of inquiry.” In the natural sciences, for instance, concepts like “virtue” 
or “justice” simply have no place, and a concept like “warmth of heart” will either 
be entirely meaningless or demand a transliteration into thermometric terms so 
as to render the phrase almost entirely unintelligible to anyone who employs it in 
an everyday context. Also in the natural sciences, concepts like “epistemology,” 
“historical context,” and “situatedness” are mostly foreign. This is precisely what 
Thomas Kuhn meant to emphasize with the notion of “the incommensurability 
of paradigms” that he set forth in his 1962 work The Structure of  Scientific 
Revolutions.3 Kuhn observed that old paradigms are not falsified, but rather 
discarded. For this reason, he argued, it is naïve to imagine that the Copernican 
theory disproved the Ptolemaic one. Both systems were means of interpreting 
astronomical observations, and thus the geocentric model was not, nor could it 
have been, disproven by the heliocentric one. Instead it was merely replaced. In 
Kuhn’s words: 
One of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion 
for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be 
assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the 
community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other 
problems, including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as 
metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline or sometimes as just too 
problematic to be worth the time.4  
Kuhn lent concise articulation to the principle that “evidence” is always 
correlative to a given theory that it is evidence for. The notion, therefore, that 
 
2 Plotinus, Enneads 4.3.1, trans., Stephen MacKenna (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1992), 448. 
3 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962), 148.  
4 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 37. 
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one paradigm could disprove another is mistaken, and entertaining it depends on 
overlooking the inherent connection between theory and evidence that Kuhn 
brought to light.  
Similar paradigmatic supersessions to the Copernican Revolution were to 
transpire over the centuries to follow. First the sun was displaced from the center 
of the universe but the universe was still imagined to have a center. Then, in the 
early part of the twentieth century, the universe itself was theorized to be 
expanding, and absolute location was discarded in favor of relativistic space-time 
as a result of the work of Albert Einstein and Edward Hubble. Even these 
transformations, however, are comparatively trivial relative to the revolutionary 
shift from the Medieval paradigm into the Modern one because the 
transformations above are essentially rearrangements of physical bodies. The 
Medieval world-conception, by contrast, did not conceptualize the stars and 
planets as merely material things at all, but as symbols of angelic intelligences. An 
inquiry into the enchanted world-conception that framed pre-Modern 
humanity’s experience would take the present inquiry too far outside of the orbit 
of its concentration. Suffice it, therefore, to have indicated the profundity of the 
transition between these epochs and to hear it as a sort of blast on a slug-horn of 
history that calls out a challenge of comprehension. 
Returning to the attempt to clarify the essential distinction set forth at the 
outset of this section: the transition from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican solar 
system presents an example drawn from the history of ideas. The heliocentric 
model is a theory that is sensible and harmonious relative to the paradigm of 
Early Modern thinkers. On the contrary, when Aristarchus of Samos set forth in 
the third century B.C. essentially the same theory that Copernicus5 would publish 
some seventeen odd centuries later with his epochal 
De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, it was soundly rejected because of its dissonance 
with the Classical world-conception. This is clear because Copernicus could 
freshly propose it some seventeen centuries later. In summary, the dominant 
paradigm of Aristarchus’ day was not the same as that of Copernicus’ and a given 
paradigm will be conducive to certain ideas and not to others. If one should then 
attempt to conceive of an order behind the very procession and transformation 
 
5 Henri Bortoft, Taking Appearances Seriously (London, UK: Floris Books, 2012), 48. 
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of these paradigmata themselves with the march of time, then one will have 
grasped the notion of the evolution of consciousness. The evolution of 
consciousness allows one to see, in the procession of the paradigms, more than 
historical happenstance. It is to be hoped that by the end of this study, this subject 
may stand forth in clear relief. Before I proceed, however, one brief note on 
terminology may help to consolidate the argument hitherto. Kuhn refers to the 
heliocentric and geocentric theories as “paradigms.” I have opted to call them 
“theories,” however, and to reserve “paradigm” to refer to the raft of tacit theories 
that situates a people’s perception of the world. To preserve this distinction will 
make it easier to get at the changes in consciousness that are like the river on 
which these rafts float. As I indicated above, Barfield’s knowledge of this territory 
is rare, and it is to his guidance, therefore, that I will now turn. 
Perhaps the most essential concept to Barfield’s theory of the evolution of 
consciousness is that of participation. The manner by which participation transforms 
through history is the same as that by which consciousness evolves. Put another way, 
a condition of consciousness may be evaluated and classified according to its 
mode of participation. In order to understand the implications of the proposition 
that participation undergoes a diachronic transformation, it will be necessary first 
to apprehend the notion synchronically. Participation was a technical term for the 
Schoolmen of the Middle Ages. They, in turn, inherited it with the rich 
philosophical lineage that flowed like a river of wisdom through Plato, Aristotle, 
and the New Testament and Neo-Platonist writers like Proclus, Boethius, and 
Dionysius the Areopagite. These philosophers wrote in Greek of course, so they 
expressed the notion of participation by terms like “metalepsis” (μετάληψις), 
“methexis” (μέθεξις), or sometimes “koinonia” (κοινωνία). To understand the 
notion of participation, one may turn to Aquinas, who defines the term in the 
preface to his commentary on Boethius’ De hebdomadibus.6 Aquinas identifies three 
genera of participation: 
(i) A particular takes part of an universal. He offers the following examples of this 
genus of participation: man participates animal, and Socrates participates man. 
(ii) Similarly, a subject participates its accident. Also, matter participates form. 
Aquinas does not feel it necessary to offer any examples of this second genus, but 
 
6 Barfield, Saving the Appearances (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1965), 90. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 52 
we could borrow an idiosyncratic example from Aristotle and say that Socrates 
participates “snub-nosedness” because he, as a subject, possessed a snub-nose, as 
an accident.7 Similarly, blood and bones participate Socrates because Socrates is 
the form of blood and bones and the matter of the respective form. These are 
examples of subject-accident and matter-form relations, respectively. 
(iii) Also, an effect participates its cause. Barfield specifically cites the example 
that Aquinas offers in this case: “Suppose we say that air participates the light of 
the sun, because it does not receive it in that clarity in which it is in the sun.” The 
sun being the cause of the light, the air participates that cause.8 
Every particular participates its universal, every effect participates its cause, 
all matter participates its form, and so on. Similarly, in the most fundamental 
manner, all beings participate Being (plura entia, sed non plus entis), and all things 
that were made participate the Lógos (Λóγος), which is to say, the intelligibility of 
Being, or the word-like nature of the world. This connection provides the 
rainbow-bridge to Barfield’s notion of “Final Participation,” which Barfield sets 
forth as a condition of future attainment as the fruition of “Original Participation” 
of Ancient peoples and sublation of non-participation or “Onlooker 
Consciousness” of Modern and contemporary human beings. I will briefly 
examine each of these conditions as well as the passage between them, before 
returning to the notion of Final Participation in the last section of this study. 
Barfield presents the development of these stages in his 1957 book Saving the 
Appearances. Drawing on philological, anthropological, and anthroposophical 
evidence, Barfield argues that the manner in which a Primitive human being 
perceived the world is not the same as that by which a Modern one perceives it 
today. Barfield suggests the manner in which the philologist may discern the way 
that the transformation of  language mirrors the transformation of  the minds that use that 
language: “the full meanings of words are flashing, iridescent shapes like flames—
ever-flickering vestiges of the slowly evolving consciousness beneath them.”9 Signs 
must be read in the fire. In fact, words are one form of language, but not its only 
form—as Gadamer most incisively observed, “Being that can be understood is 
 
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1037a, trans. Hugh Tredennick. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1989), 329. 
8 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 90. 
9 Barfield, Poetic Diction (London: Faber and Faber, 1928/1952), 75. 
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language.”10 Speech and written language is a concentration of the same principle 
that accounts for the intelligibility of the world itself, or Lógos. Barfield 
undoubtedly meant to express a similar insight when he remarked that “Strictly 
speaking, only idolators can raise the question of the ‘origin of language.’ For 
anyone else to do so is like asking for ‘the origin of origin.’”11 Words are symbols 
of meanings, and so are objects. To imagine it were possible to step outside of 
meaning and inquire into its beginnings is perhaps as contradictory as the notion 
of an omnipotent being creating a stone too heavy for that same being to lift. 
Similarly, only by drastically impoverishing our notion of language is it possible 
to inquire into its origin. Saving the Appearances begins, indeed, not with the 
question of verbal language, but with an inquiry into the intelligibility of the 
world. Just as the legibility of a text is integral to the text itself, so the intelligibility 
of the world through perception is not something added on after the fact. Quite 
on the contrary, the (objective) world is correlative to (subjective) consciousness. Put 
another way, an unrepresented, unperceived, or “unfigurated” phenomenon is 
not a phenomenon.  
“Look at a rainbow,” Barfield enjoins the reader in the first sentence of Saving 
the Appearances.12 The rainbow, Barfield observes, is a phenomenon of which 
necessary conditions are light, raindrops, a seeing eye, and as a specific 
relationship between the three. “Is [the rainbow] really there?” he invites us to 
wonder. The basic way in which the rainbow is there is obvious as the condition 
that allows us to pose such a question in the first place. In other words, we must 
have some phenomenon whose existence we can dispute. In very specific terms: 
the rainbow must appear to us. It must (i) appear because otherwise we would not 
inquire about it. It is must appear to (ii) us because otherwise we might call it not 
“a rainbow” but “the private hallucination of a rainbow.” In Barfield’s terms, the 
rainbow is a representation that is at least potentially shared, or a “collective 
representation” in contrast to a personal one. The rainbow must appear (iii) to us 
because, to reiterate the proposition from above, it is senseless to speak of an 
 
10 Original German: “Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache.” Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, NY: 
Continuum, 1975), 470. German text accessed through a Google Books preview of Wahrheit und Methode. 
Available at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Wahrheit_und_Methode 
Accessed on 2019-11-11.   
11 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 123. 
12 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 15. 
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unperceived phenomenon and the rainbow is a phenomenon. Indeed, the 
rainbow is in many ways the quintessential phenomenon, which likely accounts 
for its appearance in the first sentence of Barfield’s magnum opus as well as its 
countless appearances in mythology from around the world, from the Old 
Testament in which it continually reappears as a signature of God’s covenant with 
Noah and his descendants—“I do set my bow in the cloud, and it shall be for a 
token of a covenant between me and the earth,”13—to Bifröst, “the Rainbow 
Bridge” between Asgard and Middle-Earth of which Heimdallr is the march-warden, 
to Iris, of whom Socrates said that “this feeling of wonder shows that you are a 
philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said 
that Iris was the child of Thaumas made a good genealogy,”14 and Homer says 
“And now Iris, fleet as the wind, was sent by Jove to tell the bad news among the 
Trojans”15 and so on in myriad other iconic examples. The rainbow, as the 
quintessential phenomenon, is Nature’s symbol of the sacred communion 
between Heaven and Earth, the Above and the Below, self and world, etc…. The 
consummation of philosophy is to experience the transcendence of these 
apparent disjunctions. This is to reveal the disjunctive elements a polarity and 
thereby not two, but three-in-one, since the communion of two poles is not a 
tertium quid of the same order of the antipodes, but a mediary factor that both 
subtends and supersedes them. In this manner, I have delineated the ways in 
which the rainbow is “really there.” I will revisit these stations presently. The 
manner in which it is not there, however, remains to be considered. 
One way in which the rainbow is not there is that its appearance is contingent 
on specific objective conditions including rain, light, and angle of incidence of the 
latter amongst countless others. To seriously assert that anything that is 
contingent on objective conditions, however, is not really there is likely quite a bit 
more than the majority of people will be likely to venture. Certainly the opposite 
of that assumption constitutes an axiomatic postulate of science as we know it and 
tacitly underlies most of our ordinary interaction with the material world. 
Barfield points out that a tree is no different than the rainbow in this respect, 
since despite conceding that one could anatomize the tree into its elemental 
 
13 Genesis 9:13. 
14 Plato, Theaetetus 155d, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 55. 
15 Homer, The Iliad 2.786, trans. Samuel Butler (Tucson, AZ: AMS Press, 1968), 36. 
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constituents like carbon and phosphorus, still we call it by what it is and not what 
it is made of. Moreover, the elements are no longer a tree following the analysis. 
To invoke Aristotle’s terminology, we call a thing by its form and not its matter, 
since the first is what the thing is: wood by itself is not a bed.16 Similarly, we do 
not refer to our present subject as “obliquely transluminated water-droplets,” but 
as “a rainbow.” Another manner in which the rainbow might not be there is that 
it might be dreamed or hallucinated. The same method by which we ratify any 
other perception, however, like that of a walnut tree, for instance, is sufficient to 
decide the strength of this objection. If our hypothetical rainbow is perceptible to 
any hypothetical being endowed with the requisite faculties to function as a 
percipient of it, then the concern is moot. If the representation of the rainbow is 
(at least potentially) collective, then it is “really there.”  
Already, however, the reader may sense the direction of Barfield’s reasoning, 
which I will presently attempt to flesh out. First, however, I will consider a third 
way in which the rainbow might not really be there: it is contingent on a subject to 
perceive it. This will likely strike many readers as the weightiest objection, since 
some genus of naïve realism appears to be the implicit paradigm of the age, the 
indications of contemporary physics and post-Kantian philosophy 
notwithstanding. In opposition to this trend, however, Barfield attempts to 
demonstrate that subjectivity is an element and not an epiphenomenon of the world. 
That the rainbow is contingent on my mind does not make it subjective in the 
solipsistic meaning of that word. After all, the physical world appears objective 
because I did not create it and instead am confronted by it. But I also did not 
create my mind. Rather my mind and the rainbow, and every other 
phenomenon, share a common origin in the metaphysical heart of the world. It 
is a mistake in both fact and logic to suppose that ideas are subjective merely 
because they depend on a mind for their appearance. If anything is subjective, it 
is the sensory stimuli that provide for the recognition of an idea such as “rainbow” 
or “geranium.” The idea itself, however, is by nature transpersonal and universal. 
Indeed, there is no limit to the number of minds that may participate a single 
concept any more than there is (in principle) any restriction on how many people 
may read the present study. Again, therefore, to object that the contingency of 
 
16 Cf.  Aristotle, Physics 193a, trans. William Charlton (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1970), 18. 
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the rainbow’s existence on a subject to perceive it should nullify that very 
existence simply proves too much. If there were truth to the objection, it could 
not be made since we would have no way to know that the concepts out of which 
the objection were crafted were at all similar to what we had understood them to 
be. Instead, we must assume the ability to participate shared concepts as a 
condition for communication as such—even the communication of spurious 
objections. Once it is conceded that the collective representation of the rainbow 
is no less real because it depends on an eye to perceive it and a mind to conceive 
it, Barfield underscores the obvious fact that the same acknowledgement must be 
extended to include all phenomena.  
2. THE EVOLUTION OF PARTICIPATION  
Having established that the world consists in collective representations, Barfield 
goes on to demonstrate the manner in which the mode of collective 
representation has undergone a metamorphosis through history. He establishes 
three general epochs in the evolution of consciousness:  
(i) the “Original Participation” of Ancient and Primordial peoples 
(ii) the “Onlooker Consciousness” of Modern post-scientific cultures, and  
(iii) the “Final Participation” of the age to come. 
 I will briefly survey the nature of each of these epochs with special emphasis 
on the last. Let me begin, however, by attempting to understand the most ancient 
form of consciousness, which Barfield intends to designate by the term “Original 
Participation.” I will do this by considering several examples in which this mode 
of consciousness is made manifest with especial clarity. Barfield himself arrived 
at his fundamental thesis on the evolution of consciousness through his work in 
philology, which culminated with the publication of Poetic Diction in 1928. After 
winning through to this insight through his own independent research, Barfield 
was later to discover the same thesis corroborated and elaborated to an immense 
degree, though not contradicted in any essential points, by none other than 
Rudolf Steiner, whom Barfield, together with the present writer, regard as the 
foremost prophet and exemplar of Final Participation in our age. This being a 
study of Barfield and not Steiner, however, the reader must be left, being so 
obliged, to make her own acquaintance with the Steiner’s work. 
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Returning to the question of the history of participation, Barfield observed in 
his early studies that figurative language, or “poetic diction” was capable of 
producing “a felt change in consciousness”17 in the reader and he began to inquire 
into the nature of this shift. He soon discovered strange phylogenetic anomalies 
in relation to the effect of figurative language. Specifically, it appeared that every 
word with an immaterial denotation once had a material one. “Wrong,” for 
instance, once meant “crooked,” while “right” meant “straight.” Barfield notes 
that this change is conventionally explained by ascribing it to the deliberate use 
of metaphor by human beings as they became more sophisticated. Coleridge’s 
use of “perspective,” for instance, a term from optics, to refer to “point of view” 
in the psychological sense, is an example of such a deliberate evocation of “the 
before unapprehended relations of things.”18 Obviously, one has been compelled 
to explain one metaphor with another, since “point of view” is also a term 
borrowed from the context of visual perception and therefore, a metaphor for 
what we frequently mean by it. Thus, the conventional explanation only sweeps 
the question under the rug. In fact, there is no such thing as material or literal 
language in the naïve sense in which it is often imagined, because the language 
is always a sign or symbol of meaning. If this were not the case, we would not be 
able to read or communicate, since we would see only glyphs, without knowing 
that that is what they were, and hear only sound “signifying nothing.”19 Language 
is essentially and inextricably figurative. Any successful communication must 
depend on the reader’s intuitive ability to apprehend the meaning what the 
vehicle of expression is enlisted to convey. The word “metaphor” itself captures 
this fact in a particularly expressive manner, since it means something like “over-
bearer” (meta- “above,” “over,” “after,” or “about” + phorein “to bear” or “to fare”). 
All communication is accomplished through the inner apprehension of an outer 
sign, the latter which ferries the former between minds.  
After a thorough investigation into the subject, Barfield concludes that the 
hypothesis that Ancient people employed the same use of metaphor to denote 
immaterial objects with words whose referent was a material one simply fails from 
 
17 Barfield, Poetic Diction, 48. 
18 Percy Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry,” Poetry and Prose of the Romantic Period,  Ed. Russell Noyes (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1956), 1098. 
19 Shakespeare, Macbeth 5.5. 
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lack of evidence. On the contrary, Barfield convincingly argues that the 
consciousness of Ancient humanity simply did not provide for the polarization of 
the world into a material and an immaterial aspect and therefore this division 
does not appear in language either. He offers the exquisitely illustrative example 
of the word “heart” as an entry-point for Modern people into the Ancient 
experience of the world, since the polarization of the word “heart” into an 
anatomical and a spiritual designation is not complete. When a courtier exclaims 
“O! how my heart is rent in twain by knife of your unkindness” this is not exactly 
a medical diagnosis, though the surgeon might perform a similar operation on a 
physical organ that is also an heart without the affect that the phrase connotes. 
These meanings, though separate, are not entirely so. For Barfield, the word 
“heart”—or more precisely, the meaning of the word “heart”—is simply in the 
process of undergoing a polarization in human experience that the majority of 
phenomena have long since completed.  
Let the present writer here take the opportunity to stave off the objection that 
Barfield has extrapolated a thesis about the use of language to an over-arching 
claim about the world. Admittedly, such an objection is unlikely from one who 
has grasped the thread of argument to this point, since Barfield’s insight is 
precisely that “the world” is inseparable from our experience of, and manner of 
perceiving it. He further assumes, as a postulate, that the latter will leave its stamp 
on the use of language, and he discovered in his research that the latter had 
indeed undergone a transformation through history. If the postulate that the use 
of language should reflect the manner in which people perceive and 
conceptualize the world seems unwarranted, let the reader consider the all but 
absurd notion that it should not—that language bore no resemblance to the world 
as we experience it. It is an impossible contention because it depends, to be 
formulated and grasped, on the same isomorphism that it putatively seeks to 
reject. Any claim about the world must presuppose that the language in which 
the same is formulated is capable of sustaining some relation to it. Word and 
world, therefore, are heteronymous but not ultimately heterogeneous; they are 
two breaths in the wind of meaning.  
The implication of Barfield’s thesis is that changes in language testify to 
changes in the consciousness which uses that language. The consciousness that 
stamps its changes in language is the same consciousness by which the world is 
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experienced. Philological evidence suggests that Ancient humanity perceived a 
world in which the separation characterized two paragraphs earlier—between 
material and immaterial imports—had not taken place. If one assume this 
possibility as an hypothesis, a line from the John Gospel shines forth like a nova in 
one’s apprehension; a nova whose light will easily illuminate the entire book from 
which the line was drawn. The King James Version of the Bible translates the Greek 
text of John 3:8 τὸ πνεῦμα ὅπου θέλει πνεῖ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, 
ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει· οὕτως ἐστὶν πᾶς ὁ 
γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος in the following manner:  
The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst 
not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the 
Spirit.  
The pleasing poetic quality of the King James Version notwithstanding, an 
English translation of that line is impossible. The reason for this is that, as the 
careful reader may have noted, the words “wind,” “breath,” and “Spirit,” are all 
the same word in the Greek original: pneuma, πνεῦμα. The line might, therefore, 
have read “The spirit breathes (or respires, or inspires) where it will, its sound you 
hear, but you do not know whence it comes or whither it goes; such is everyone 
born of the wind.” It could have rendered in countless other forms as well. The 
profit in this quandary lies in whether it can help us to conceive of a world in 
which “wind,” “breath” and “Spirit” meant the same thing. Put another way, the 
selfsame perception could be called by any one of these words. Imagination often 
provides the most comprehensive insight: we may imagine a solution of meaning 
out of which these three words gradually crystallize.  
Psychologist Julian Jaynes offers another view into the world of Original 
Participation in his seminal 1967 work The Origins of  Consciousness in the Breakdown 
of  the Bicameral Mind. Jaynes, like Barfield, interprets ancient texts not as stories but 
as histories. In other words, the gods and goddesses of the Homeric epics are not 
poetic inventions, but rather factual, historical descriptions of the manner in 
which Ancient Greeks conceived the world. Jaynes writes of the Iliad that: 
It is one god who makes Achilles promise not to go into battle, another who urges 
him to go, and another who then clothes him in a golden fire reaching up to heaven 
and screams through his throat across the bloodied trench at the Trojans, rousing 
in them ungovernable panic. In fact, the gods take the place of [personal] 
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consciousness.20 
One need not evaluate all of Jaynes’ arguments to appreciate his conviction 
that the Ancient Greeks perceived a different world, in a different manner, from 
the ordinary man of today. Jaynes asserts that this difference is an expression of 
the lack of inner subjectivity and deliberation on the part of the characters. What 
we today experience inwardly as thought, emotion, and volition, Achilles 
experienced objectively as the deeds of gods. Again, to imagine the condensation 
of discrete aspects out of a common solution confers the nature of this evolution 
in a comprehensive and intuitive way.  
Barfield emphasizes that there was nothing capricious or arbitrary in the 
manner that ancient people developed their mythologies. The arbitrariness lies, 
on the contrary, with Modern anthropologists who misinterpret the origins and 
significance of this mythology as a result of having extrapolated the the mode of 
consciousness actual to our time onto other eras: 
For the nineteenth-century fantasy of early man first gazing, with his mind tabula 
rasa, at natural phenomena like ours, then seeking to explain them with thoughts 
like ours, and then by a process of inference ‘peopling’ them with the ‘aery 
phantoms’ of mythology, there just is not any single shred of evidence whatever.21 
This is to say that the theory of artful use of metaphor and “peopling” of 
nature with the figures of mythology, despite being a plausible theory, fails from 
dearth of evidence. Barfield argues against the conventional belief that Ancient 
peoples did not first perceive more-or-less the same phenomenal world that we 
see today and then proceed to invent all manner of fantasies and figments to 
explain its proceedings. Quite on the contrary, the phenomenal world itself was 
not the same in ancient times as in modern ones. Put another way, the Onlooker 
Consciousness of the ordinary human being of today not only perceives and 
interprets the world differently than the Original Participating consciousness of 
the past, but the very world itself is different. It is to be hoped that by this point 
in the present study, the inseparability of the perception of the world with the 
conception of the world has been thoroughly established and that a proposition like 
the above strikes the reader as perfectly natural. Allow me, however, to explore 
 
20 Jaynes, The Origins of Consciousness, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 72. 
21 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 42. 
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the meaning of such a difference in slightly more depth before turning towards 
“Final Participation.” 
3. FIGURATION, ALPHA-THINKING, & BETA-THINKING 
What might it mean to say Onlooker Consciousness perceives the world 
differently and also perceives a different world? Barfield offers several terms that 
will prove exceedingly useful in exploring this question. The former delineates 
three types of cognition, which inform perception in diverse ways.  
(i) “Figuration” Barfield describes as the ordinarily pre-conscious 
representational activity of rendering sensory input into intelligible perceptions. 
For example, I perceive that a flower-pot has a reverse face and an interior with 
volume and dimension, as well as weight, despite that none of these things is a 
direct object of sense. “Substantiality” is itself a tacit theory of figuration and not 
an immediate object of sense, as is “materiality,” and “externality.” Indeed, 
literally every organizing idea by which we structure our perception of the world 
is a fruit of figuration and not a datum of sense. The senses perceive only sensations 
and not objects or concepts. My perception of any object, therefore, is always the 
result of the process of cognition that Barfield means to indicate with the term 
“figuration.” On other occasions, he employs the term “representation” to indicate 
roughly the same cognitive process.  
(ii) On the coattails of figuration, it is possible to elaborate further conceptual 
relations, and critique implicit ones between the primitive products of perception 
that figuration provided. Barfield refers to this activity by the perhaps deliberately 
unfelicitous phrase “alpha-thinking.” As an example of alpha-thinking: I may note 
that the geranium planted in the flower-pot has blossoms made of plastic. At once, 
this observation will set my alpha-thinking into motion in attempt to reconcile the 
conceptual incongruity of a living thing made of lifeless material. The final issue of 
the flurry of thinking will be the precipitation of a new figuration: “fake plant” and 
not “geranium.” Clearly the boundary between figuration and alpha-thinking is 
one which is continually traversed. As another example of the “double-take” of 
figuration and alpha-thinking, Barfield invites us to consider the case of a thrush 
singing: what do we hear, we might ask? A noise, a birdsong, the birdsong of a 
thrush, or the mating call of an American Robin (turdus migratorius)? What is heard 
today may be heard differently and therefore likely different tomorrow. In 
Barfield’s words, “I say I ‘hear a thrush singing outside my window’. But do I? He 
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is invisible, and it might perhaps be a blackbird; I have begun the business of 
thinking…already!”22  
Our conceptual knowledge is continually informing our perceptions. In fact, 
perception just is the fixation of a bouquet of transcendental ideas in a particular 
vessel of sensory stimuli. 
(iii) Together with figuration and alpha-thinking, Barfield also distinguishes a 
third type of cognition, differentiated from the preceding one more by its object 
than by its nature. “Beta-thinking” is the term that Barfield employs to denote the 
very process which we are presently undertaking: “thinking about thinking.” Thus, 
while the object of alpha-thinking is figuration, the object of beta-thinking is alpha-
thinking. In the same manner by which alpha-thinking may elaborate or critique 
figuration, so may beta-thinking critically evaluate posits and propositions set forth 
by alpha-thinking. Indeed, this entire article is largely just this sort of undertaking.  
4. FINAL PARTICIPATION 
The Onlooker Consciousness that characterizes the Modern human being has 
its center of gravity, so to speak, in the activity of alpha-thinking. Figuration, for 
Onlooker Consciousness is largely an unconscious process: we do not ordinarily 
experience the manner by which our cognition weaves the tapestry of collective 
representation out of the senses’ threads. Instead, we wake up to a world of objects 
and then begin to think about them, often with the purpose of manipulating them 
towards our own preferences of utility. Put another way, Onlooker Consciousness 
is defined by the basic subject-object structure of perception that Descartes so 
notoriously characterized. Barfield describes Onlooker Consciousness as 
“idolatrous” for the reason that it treats an image as something independent of 
imagination. Put another way, an object becomes an idol when the subject 
discounts her own activity of representation or figuration that is inherent to 
perception as the condition it. Onlooker Consciousness is characterized as 
precisely the neglect of this activity. Onlooker Consciousness, Barfield writes: 
had clothed [the representations] with the independence and extrinsicality of the 
unrepresented itself. But a representation, which is collectively mistaken for an 
ultimate—ought not to be called a representation. It is an idol. Thus the 
phenomena themselves are idols, when they are imagined as enjoying that 
independence of human perception which can in fact only pertain to the 
 
22 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 34. 
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unrepresented.23 
To recapitulate, it is only in virtue of our conceptualization and representation 
of things as “external objects” that they are perceptible to us as such. It is senseless 
to think about an unrepresented world because by thinking of it, we are 
representing it. By the same token, if it is unrepresented, then it is not a world. 
Put another way, it is the posit of “externality” or “extrinsicality” that discloses a 
world of external objects to consciousness in the first place. If the intentionality 
of the former were done away with, the latter would follow as a consequence and 
the same scenario would be experienced as a hallucination. This means that we 
sustain the integrity of the objective world through every act of cognition. No less 
could a chorus of thrushes persist with the silence of its members than the world 
could run on outside of consciousness. 
Final participation implies the consciousness of our own participation of the 
creative principle of reality—of the Lógos. To participate this creative and organizing 
principle—that “by which all things were made”—however, is simultaneously to 
be participated by all things that were made. “The way up is the way down,” in 
Heraclitus’ terse formulation.24 Barfield alludes to the implications of this 
realization: 
To renounce the heterogeneity of observed from observer involves, if it is taken 
seriously, abandoning the whole “onlooker” stance, upon which both the pursuit 
of science and modern language-use in general are based; it means advancing to 
awareness of another relation altogether between mind and matter. If we had 
actually made the advance, we should have become naturally, unforcedly, and 
unremittingly aware that the mind cannot refer to a natural object without at the 
same time referring to its own activity...scientific discovery is always a discovery 
about language, but also that it is always a discovery about the self which uses 
language.25 
Obviously, to acknowledge a correlation of mind and world of such a degree 
would entirely overturn the paradigm of convention today. Only a gadfly will 
criticize a thing without patent fault, but only an ostrich will bury its head in the 
 
23 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 62. 
24 “ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή,” DK 60. John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, (London: Adam & Charles 
Black, 1920), 138. 
25 Barfield, “Language and Discovery,” The Rediscovery of Meaning and Other Essays (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1977), 139. 
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sand when the wealth of evidence has cried out for substantial transformation.  
It is likely that few people will directly contest the above, few think all the way 
through its implications, and fewer still will not set about forgetting them the 
moment the object of their attention shifts from the beta-thinking which revealed 
this connection to alpha-thinking which conceals it. Barfield, however, was an 
exceptional thinker, both for his insight and his integrity. The notion of Final 
Participation is an inevitable inference from the discovery of this correlation. 
Given that the mind is already operative in even the most rudimentary 
perceptual acts, the mind can awaken to this activity, and intensify it. This 
changes the world. “This changes the world” is not a cliché or a figure of speech, 
but a literal statement of fact. Awakening to our own creative activity in 
perception changes the world because the world is phenomenal and cognition is 
not outside of it. Cognition is a fact—a fact that subtends all other facts. If I fail 
to include it in my conception of the world, I have set forth a proposition that is 
not only deficient, but actually nullifies itself in its very issue. We perceive the 
world according to how we conceive of it—through eyesight, perhaps, but by 
insight. And if we assume this mantle of responsibility, once born by the gods of 
old, then we participate finally the same Lógos which our ancestors participated 
originally. “Is it not written in your law, I have said, Ye are gods?”26 This is quite 
a vertiginous conclusion so I will attempt to come at it by a different route to 
demonstrate that I have not attained this height by some trickery or deception, 
and also to acclimate the mind to this path by means of the repeated ascent. 
Let the reader again consider that there is no such thing as an imperceptible 
phenomenon. Again, phenomenon literally means “what shows itself,” or “what 
appears” (φαινόμενον). It is perhaps hard to think this way today because we 
are bewitched by philosophers and scientists like Kant and Einstein into thinking 
that real reality must be mathematised and imperceptible, hidden behind a veil 
of transcendental conditions or differential equations. But let us imagine Einstein 
recapitulating Newton’s notorious experiment with falling fruit. If Einstein, after 
developing his theory of General Relativity in 1916, were to watch an apple fall, 
would not have seen, in the mode of Aristotle and the natural philosophers of old, 
the Earth element striving to rejoin its Mother. Nor would he have seen the 
 
26 John 10:34. 
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operation of universal gravitation, in the manner of Newton. Instead, Einstein 
would have perceived a demonstration of warped spacetime around a massive 
body. Obviously he would not see this with his eyes. Still this is hardly an 
objection, since, as noted above, it is a rule of perception. We don’t see with our 
eyes but through them. Thus, the fact that Einstein perceived the phenomenon 
with his mind does not imply that he did not perceive it. On the contrary, mental 
activity is a condition of all perception, as I have attempted to demonstrate 
through this entire study.  
In the interest of elucidating the manner in which we participate in the 
figuration of the world through our own cognition, one may attempt to retrace 
the development of the present condition. If one should consider gravity as 
weight, it will be evident that the idea of gravity is immanent to the object in 
question, and active in it. As Barfield writes: 
The essence of original participation is that there stands behind the phenomena, 
and on the other side of them from me, a represented which is of the same nature 
as me. Whether it is called “mana,” or by the names of many gods and demons, or 
God the Father, or the spirit world, it is of the same nature as the perceiving self, 
inasmuch as it is not mechanical or accidental, but psychic and voluntary.27 
On first sight, the example that I selected above might seem to contradict 
Barfield’s more mystical characterization of Original Participation. Closer 
scrutiny, however, will reveal that Barfield’s remark offers insight into a difference 
in the perception of gravity that would otherwise all too-easily be glossed over: 
namely, that before the Scientific Revolution, weight was indeed something 
“psychic and voluntary.” Nature, or physis (φύσις) itself was conceptualized and 
experienced as psychic and voluntary. A massive object fell not because of an 
abstract, universal field of force, but because of its inherent nature to strive 
towards the center of the cosmos. Put another way, gravity was perceived as a 
trait intrinsic to a given body. By the middle of the twentieth century, “body” 
itself is a problematic term since matter is conceptualized as a collapse occasioned 
by measurement and described by wave-functions, of fields of probability for such 
collapses.28 For this reason, to imagine a simple and concrete bearer of predicates 
 
27 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 42. 
28 Cf. John von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (London, UK: Princeton University 
Press, 1955), 213. 
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such predicates as “gravity” can only be regarded an impertinent and outmoded 
notion. 
The consciousness general to the present moment in history no longer 
provides for the same participatory experience in the act of figuration of our 
distant forbears. The latter resulted in a world populated with phenomena or 
beings, and not mere objects. Put another way, every object had an inside as well 
as an outside. Nor does the consciousness general to today allow for the optimistic 
and uncritical trust in alpha-thinking that was the engine of Scholastic philosophy 
and Modern science. The development of Onlooker Consciousness from the 
Participatory Consciousness of the Ancients enabled the gradual accretion of 
conceptual relations by means of alpha-thinking so as to ultimately all but bury 
from sight, the figuration that is part and parcel the very phenomena that alpha-
thinking takes as its object. Increasingly, these fruits of figuration are imagined as 
heterogeneous to the mind that participated their origin but which now confronts 
them in the habit of extrinsicality. Objects are no longer experienced as 
phenomena, but as brute facts. At the same time, this very estrangement of the 
mind from the phenomenal world creates a womb in which individuality may 
gestate. Thus, the evolution of consciousness over the last millennia traces the 
concomitant waning of participation and waxing of self-consciousness.  
Barfield alludes to this evolution when he describes the manner in which 
Aristotle’s nous (νοῦς) was “more cosmic” than Aquinas’ intellectus, despite that 
the latter was intended as a direct translation of the former into Latin.29 The 
manner by which the same subsequently became Descartes’ res cogitans further 
articulates this process, as does that by which Aristotle’s notion of 
hylomorphism—or matter-form composition—became the Cartesian 
conception of res extensa set against res cogitans. Another sign of this 
transformation is the process by which the gods which inspired Homer to sing of 
the wrath of Achilles—which also “grabbed [the hero’s] golden hair,” and 
“screamed in his throat”—became natural laws on one hand, and the neuroses 
of the Freudian unconscious or the archetypes of the Jungian one on the other. 
The Horse of Troy became the horseplay of repressed drives. Barfield again 
expresses this metamorphosis with exemplary clarity: 
 
29 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 100. 
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Original participation fires the heart from a source outside itself; the images enliven 
the heart. But in Final Participation—since the death and resurrection—the heart 
is fired from within by the Christ; and it is for the heart to enliven the images.30 
The reader may be confused by the reference to Christ. Given its connection 
to the Lógos, however, it can hardly come as altogether a surprise. Perhaps we 
ought at least to consider the possibility that our eventual inability to understand 
the connection of the Christ to the evolution of consciousness might be a result 
of precisely the veil of Onlooker Consciousness which we are attempting to lift. 
Barfield leaves no room for equivocation of what he means: “Christ is the cosmic 
wisdom on its way from Original to Final Participation.”31 The present writer is 
confident that, were one to entertain the above as an hypothesis, it would disclose 
so many thitherto connections in “nature’s infinite book of secrecy”32 that one 
would be unlikely to discard it. And this is precisely the manner by which a theory 
is vetted and ratified— “by its fruits shall ye know the tree,”33 and by its facts ye 
shall know the theory. In turn, as propositions are the meaning of syllables, so a 
theory is what facts mean. Thus, when Barfield writes “I am not flinging [this] 
out casually. On the contrary I find it so tall that it fills the earth and the sky and 
is for me the whole meaning of history and, if you like, of time itself,”34 he intends 
this in a very precise sense. Barfield goes even further, arguing that a theory like 
the above—that Christ is the bridge between the past and future of 
Participation—is, in fact, the only way to make sense of the facts on hand.  
 
When we look back on past periods of history, we are often confronted with 
inconsistencies and blind spots in human thinking, which to us are so palpable 
that we are almost astonished out of belief. We find it hard to credit the 
inescapable fact that they remained, for decades or for centuries, completely 
invisible not only to the generality of men but also to the choicest and wisest spirits 
of the age. Such are the Athenian emphasis on liberty—with the system of slavery 
accepted as a matter of course; the notion that the truth could be ascertained and 
 
30 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 172. 
31 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 185. 
32 Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, 1.2. 
33 Luke 6:43. 
34 Barfield, “The Nature of Meaning,” Seven, 1981, 32-43. 
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justice done with the help of trial by battle; the Calvinist doctrine of pre-election 
to eternal damnation; the co-existence of a Christian ethic with an economic 
doctrine of ruthless laissez-faire; and no doubt there are other and better examples. 
I believe that the blind-spot which posterity will find most startling in the last 
hundred years or so of Western civilization, is, that it had, on the one hand, a 
religion which differed from all others in its acceptance of time, and of a particular 
point in time, as a cardinal element in its faith; that it had, on the other hand, a 
picture in its mind of the history of the earth and man as an evolutionary process; 
and that it neither saw nor supposed any connection whatever between the two.35 
In other words, were it possible to approach the issues of science, religion, and 
human existence in a disinterested and non-sectarian manner—which is, 
putatively at least, the standard of bona fide inquiry—an inherent connection 
between the sacred and the secular would be immediately manifest.  
Let the reader arrive at her own conclusion in the matter, but let her do it 
having weighed the evidence in the balance of her unprejudiced judgement. To 
approach the subject of religion in the spirit of science without allowing foregone 
allegiances to institutionalized forms of either to corrupt one’s objectivity is an 
accomplishment as excellent as it is rare. If one manage it, however, it is the 
present writer’s belief that we will discover the conjunction of science and religion. 
In a shower of sparks, we will close a circuit that has remained in disjunction for 
generations since the glow of Original Participation finally faded on the western 
horizon. The hard problem of consciousness (i.e. how does mind emerge from 
mindless natural processes?), the disenchantment of the world36 (i.e. the world of 
phenomena becomes the world of res extensa), and the “post-truth” phenomenon37 
(i.e metaphysics after Nietzsche) are all creatures native to the interstices between 
participation Original and Final. In short, with Barfield’s insights, we may begin 
to “expel the demons,” or heal the fractures and fragmentation of the present age. 
Philosophy has diversified into myriad strands and cast itself like a net into the 
waters of knowledge, into all manner of disciplines and subdisciplines. The 
harvest of our enterprise has been an all but incomprehensible proliferation of 
specialized science, but it has perhaps been won at the cost of overfishing our 
 
35 Barfield, Saving the Appearances, 167. 
36 Cf. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 26. 
37 Cf. Lee MacIntyre, Post-Truth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018). 
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understanding, and as a cost it seems to exact the demand of insight into the 
meaning of this very knowledge. Neither can the reproductive habits of 
parameciums nor the chemical composition of dust on Jupiter’s moons tell a 
person how to live. But if we share in Barfield’s vision—if, with him, we 
participate and take communion in this common world of meaning—then the 
disintegration of philosophy will rather appear as a giant out-breath; an 
expiration of science into the periphery, or a grand systolic throb issued outwards 
into innumerable capillaries of knowledge. We stand on the yonder side of the 
inflection point of this great beat of time, and the fragmentation of our era is a 
sign for our eccentric spirits to repair to the heart of wisdom from which they 
originally went forth, each bearing back to the center the individuated 
consciousness that it won through its estrangement in the periphery.  
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